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This study analyzes five countries’ false-
information policies before and during the COVID-19 
pandemic. Building upon existing discussions of 
regulation models, this paper uses a qualitative, 
comparative case study method to unpack the 
characteristics of false-information policies in each 
country. The before-after comparisons show that each 
country has a unique evolving path of false-
information regulation and that the state has enhanced 
or attempted to enhance its role in battling against the 
infodemic during the pandemic. The regulatory 
practices are a dynamic process and involve not only 
government and social media platforms but also 
multiple other actors, which is leading to more 
complex practices and blurring the boundary of 
existing models. We discuss the limitation of existing 
regulation models and suggest a relational 
perspective to understand the underlying relations 
between the state, platforms, and other stakeholders. 
1. Introduction  
While COVID-19 spreads all over the globe, the 
world also experiences an upsurge of different kinds 
of false information—fake news, rumors, myths, 
misinformation, disinformation, conspiracy theories, 
and even hatred—disseminated on social media 
platforms. As United Nations Secretary-General 
António Guterres said in a video message, a “global 
‘misinfo-demic’ is spreading,” which travels faster 
than the virus itself [1]. While some international non-
governmental organizations, including the United 
Nations and the World Health Organization, are 
leading the battle against this infodemic, virtually all 
national governments are also addressing the problem 
directly (e.g., publishing “mythbusters”) or indirectly 
(e.g., providing accurate information). This study is a 
comparative study of false-information policies before 
and during the pandemic in five national 
governments—Argentina, China, France, the US, and 
the UK. We use the phrase “false information” as an 
umbrella term for misinformation, fake news, 
disinformation, and rumors, in order to emphasize the 
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inaccuracy of content and embrace the variety of 
behavioral intentions and spread channels [2, 3]. 
This paper presents the preliminary findings and 
results of a larger and more theoretical research project 
on international misinformation policies. We try to 
answer the following research questions: What 
information policies (including laws, policies, 
regulations, orders, and government announcements) 
have these governments issued or updated during the 
COVID-19 pandemic? How do they differ from the 
pre-COVID policies? How do they differ among the 
countries? Answers to these questions come through 
an in-depth content analysis of both government 
websites and other information/news outlets to gain a 
better understanding of the impact of the global 
pandemic on misinformation-related policies. This 
preliminary analysis also enables theoretical 
discussions of broader information policy issues.   
2. Literature Review  
The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated the 
problem of false information online. Some studies 
have looked at the nature of COVID-19 related false 
information and policy reactions from the perspective 
of journalism [4] or government law-making [5-7]. 
These studies, however, only scratch the surface and 
invite further policy research.  
There does exist a considerable body of pre-
COVID false-information policy literature, which 
tends to focus on the regulation models and the 
underlying relations between two main actors, 
governments and social media platforms [8-12]. 
Several authors have proposed different models to 
theorize policy responses to inaccurate online 
information [5,9,10,13]. While they may differ 
slightly in terminology, these models are highly 
comparable. They operate along a spectrum of 
increasing governmental control, from little or no 
oversight to intense regulation which reflects different 
kinds of relation between government and platform.   
At one end of the spectrum is regulation that 
focuses on the social media platforms themselves with 
limited, if any, governmental oversight. It is known as 
self-governance, self-regulation, and even non-audited 





self-regulation, emphasizing the lack of outside 
control and voluntary actions taken by platforms with 
minimal external intervention [5,9,10,13].   
At the other end of the spectrum is the regulation 
that emphasizes the role of governments in moderating 
content on platforms. It is known as direct regulation, 
external governance, statutory regulation, and 
comprehensive government regulation [5,9,10,13]. In 
this model, governments directly regulate platforms 
via laws and legislation. This model, however, can 
also be repressive, limiting free speech, as well as 
being too complex [11,14]. These debates reflected the 
difficulty of regulating false information [15,16]. 
In the middle of the spectrum is the regulation that 
partners platforms and governments together, named 
co-governance, co-regulation, and limited government 
regulation [5,9,10,13]. An independent 3rd party 
regulator is always incorporated in this model and acts 
as a neutral regulating agency [9,13]. These actors are 
not always mutually agreeable. Governments 
sometimes threaten platforms with stricter regulation 
to motivate them to regulate themselves [11,16].   
A complementary model is the audience-centered 
approach to managing problematic information. It 
focuses on empowering audiences to discern for 
themselves [5], and it is used in combination with one 
of the other regulation models to increase their 
effectiveness or reduce the need for overzealous 
regulation [17]. All stakeholders—governments, 
platforms, and users—must be involved in regulation 
and contributing to the solution for it to be effective 
[18]. In a word, these models provide us an analytical 
foundation to understand the regulatory strategies by 
examining the relations among different stakeholders. 
Existing discussion of these models falls into two 
groups. One is analyzing national policies and laws by 
different models [10,13]. The other one is categorizing 
countries into different models based on these 
predominant regulatory practices; for example, EU 
countries are under the co-regulation model in general 
with slight differences among countries, while China 
is under the direct regulation model [5]. Our analysis 
combines these two approaches to examine the 
changes in regulation practices in different countries 
during the pandemic and identify their differences. 
3. Methodology and Research Design 
Comparative policy analysis is the systematic 
study and comparison of public policies and 
policymaking in different jurisdictions to understand 
better the factors and processes that underpin 
similarities and differences in policy choices [19]. In 
this study, using a qualitative, comparative case 
study method, we selected five diverse cases and 
examined each government’s policies regarding false 
information in the global pandemic context, including 
legislative acts, executive decrees, and administrative 
actions. We adopted the diverse case selection 
method [20], based on geographical location, 
government form, and democracy index [21] (see 
Table 1), for the purpose of identifying and 
comparing the similarities and differences among a 
variety of regulation models and the changes or 
stability of information policies before and during the 
pandemic. The five cases selected for this study also 
rank high in the number of internet users in their 
respective continents.  
Table 1: Case Selection 
Country  Location  Government Form  
Democracy 
Index Rank 
and Type  
Argentina  South America  
Federal presidential 
constitutional republic  
48, Flawed 
democracy  
China  Asia  
Unitary Marxist–
Leninist one-party 
socialist republic  
151, 
Authoritarian   














U.S.  North America  
Federal presidential 
constitutional republic  
25, Full 
democracy  
The study started with rigorous data collection, 
relying primarily on government websites. A 
combination of direct browsing and keyword 
searching strategies was used to collect any 
information related to “fake news,” “rumors,” 
“misinformation,” “disinformation,” and “conspiracy 
theories” on the national government websites and 
their major ministries, departments, branches, and 
offices. We also searched for relevant news on Google 
News and major news agencies in different countries 
using a combination of the above-mentioned 
keywords and “government,” “policy,” “legislation,” 
“rules,” and “orders.” The data collection was 
conducted between May 2020 and April 2021, using 
the official language in each country, namely, Spanish, 
Chinese, French, and English. 
The case analysis is loosely based on the 
regulation models drawn from the literature review, 
following the actor analysis method [22]. As many 
authors cited above, we look into two main actors, 
government and social media platforms with an 
emphasis on government policies, but other actors, 
such as content creators and norm guardians [23], are 
also included in the analysis. The social media 
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platforms discussed in this paper are those popular 
platforms in the specific country contexts.  
4. Findings   
4.1. Argentina  
Before the COVID-19 pandemic, Argentina’s 
efforts against fake news focused on political and 
election misinformation, following a co-regulation 
approach. During its 2019 presidential election, fake 
news became a national concern [24]; as a result, two 
major collaborative efforts were initiated to combat 
false information. One effort was a collaboration 
under the lead of government authorities, namely, 
Cámara Nacional Electoral (CNE). Political parties, 
press associations, and digital platforms signed an 
agreement on Digital Ethics with CNE to protect the 
accuracy of electoral information [25]. In particular, 
Facebook cooperated with CNE closely and monitored 
suspicious activities during the presidential election 
[26]. Another effort was led by the Chequeado project, 
a nonpartisan and nonprofit fact-checking initiative 
focused on public access to information [27]. More 
than 100 media and technology companies and non-
governmental organizations formed a consortium 
called REVERSO and acted as an independent fact-
checker of electoral information [28]. 
The government of Argentina took a more direct 
regulation strategy during the pandemic, when false 
information was disseminated expansively through 
social media platforms. It was reported that the 
political divide in Argentina was deepened during the 
pandemic quarantine and the already existing 
economic crisis [29]. Rumors about government 
measures against the coronavirus, such as claims that 
the government stopped issuing passports “to prevent 
Argentines from leaving,” were widespread [29].  
On April 8, 2020, the National Security Ministry 
announced that the security forces would carry out 
“cyber-patrols” of social network content in order to 
detect crimes in relation to COVID-19, such as 
distribution of counterfeit drugs and to “ensure 
compliance with the quarantine norms” [30]. By April 
20, at least twelve criminal cases had been opened for 
“public intimidation,” a crime punishable by up to six 
years in prison, under Argentina’s zero-tolerance 
policy on the spread of false information and possibly 
as a result of the cyber patrol actions [30]. 
The government official claimed that cyber patrol 
was a legitimate tool to maintain the safety of the 
population and to prevent crime and envisioned it to 
be “part of the guidelines of the inter-American human 
rights system” [31]. However, such actions raised 
human rights concerns and criticisms against the 
administration for free speech, privacy, censorship, 
and power concentration. Various social organizations 
(norm guardians), including Amnesty International, 
expressed concerns over these direct government 
interventions and policing actions, accusing the 
government of using the pandemic as “an excuse to 
exercise massive, indiscriminate surveillance” over 
journalists and the citizens [32]. Yet these norm 
guardians’ voices proved not to be very strong, and the 
government’s role continued to grow. 
In Argentina, the regulation of false information 
appears to transform from a pre-COVID co-regulation 
model to the during-COVID direct regulation model, 
where government holds tighter control and 
criminalizes false information distribution. 
4.2. China  
 Before the pandemic, China had already 
established a sophisticated and comprehensive 
mechanism for internet control under direct regulation 
of the government [33] with a focus on cyberspace 
security, socialist spiritual civilization, and social 
stability. Fighting “fake news,” always referred to as 
“rumors” in China, has been a crucial regulatory 
action. The regulatory tactics have included creating 
government agencies as a regulator, enacting laws and 
policies for regulating information creators and 
providers, criminalizing false information, and 
building centralized channels for fact-checking, 
official information spreading and rumor-reporting.  
China started to set up its direct regulation 
mechanism in the early 2000s, marked by the 
Measures on Internet Information Services in 2000 to 
prohibit internet information services providers from 
producing or spreading rumors that disrupt social 
order or undermine social stability [34]. The control of 
false information became stricter in 2015 when China 
added “fabricating and disseminating false 
information that seriously disturbs public order” as a 
crime to its Criminal Law [35] and publicly deployed 
cyber police to patrol the internet for illegal and 
harmful information [36]. 
Corresponding to the direct regulation, the central 
government assigned a centralized Internet 
regulator—the Cyberspace Administration of China 
(CAC)—to coordinate and supervise online content 
regulation. In 2014, CAC incorporated the Illegal and 
Unhealthy Information Report Center to enhance its 
role in false-information reporting and online rumor 
monitoring [37]. CAC is also in charge of fact-
checking and becomes the authority of verifying the 
truth of information. The central CAC and its local 
branches collaborate with state-owned media, 
government agencies, and experts in different 
domains. They collectively launched a “Joint Rumor 
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Rebuttal Platform” in 2018 as an official online 
channel to publish verified information.   
Social media platforms, as information service 
providers, are also under CAC’s direct regulation 
before the pandemic. CAC oversees the anti-rumor 
activities of these sites by tracing reported instances of 
false information on the major platforms. Frequently 
reported platforms ones are subject to punishments 
and penalties, including summoning, warning, 
administrative penalty, shutdown, etc. Under this 
pressure, these platforms have complied with the 
government’s initiatives, such as “cleaning-up 
cyberspace” and “joint advocacy of self-regulation” 
under the government’s direct orders and 
administration [38]. Large platforms also began to 
develop their own anti-rumor programs in 2015.  
These sophisticated regulatory tactics have been 
rapidly enacted to fight against false information 
related to COVID-19 in a controversial way. China’s 
direct regulation mechanism was criticized and 
challenged widely at the beginning of the pandemic 
for inhibiting the dissemination of factual information 
related to the novel coronavirus. In early January 2020 
before the official announcement of the pandemic, 
eight individuals were accused of disturbing social 
order by creating false information which was later 
verified as truthful coronavirus information. The 
government responded to this irony by tightening its 
direct control over epidemic-related information and 
enhancing online censorship for maintaining stability.  
In February 2020, CAC stressed the control of 
internet and online media by punishing rumor creators 
and releasing authoritative information. It developed a 
new module called “COVID-19 epidemic prevention 
and control and rumor debunking zone" on the anti-
rumor platform [39]. A few mobile-based apps were 
removed from app stores and several social media 
platforms were summoned or temporary shut down for 
publishing illegal or harmful information related to 
COVID-19. On February 6th, judicial departments 
issued the “Opinions on Punishing Criminal and 
Illegal Activities that Hinder the Prevention and 
Control of Novel Coronavirus Pneumonia,” which 
particularly emphasizes the battle against COVID-19 
related rumors [40].  
Social media platforms which have been 
incorporated into China’s regulatory system also 
actively engaged in this battle by detecting and 
preventing rumors related to the pandemic. Many 
platforms rapidly responded to the crisis by expending 
anti-rumor programs with COVID-19 specific 
modules. Meanwhile, they blocked a broad scope of 
content, including not only speculative information, 
but also criticism of government, references to 
whistleblowers, and references to the Chinese 
government’s efforts on handling the outbreak that had 
been reported on state media [41]. On February 7th 
when the COVID-19 whistleblower, Dr. Li Wenliang, 
died, millions of users left messages to honor him on 
Sina Weibo and other social media. These posts, 
however, were periodically deleted.  
The citizens are also similarly restricted. 
Hundreds of individuals were punished for spreading 
“pandemic related rumors” in the first quarter of 2020 
[42]. Those “rumormongers” included not only 
entities that spread misleading information but also 
individuals who shared alternative information 
sources different from the official ones [43]. 
Chinese government has enhanced its direct 
regulation of online information during the pandemic 
and the social media platforms complied. Although 
actors from various sectors are involved in the 
collaborative anti-misinformation efforts, they are 
largely under the state’s control. Compared to other 
countries, China’s foci are monitoring and debunking 
rumors more than promoting media literacy. 
4.3. France 
As part of the EU, France’s information policies 
cannot be completely separated from the EU’s 
policies. Additionally, the French policies on false 
information directly impacted the EU policies [44], so 
this section also reports findings regarding the EU. 
In the pre-COVID years, France’s battle against 
false information was focused on election 
misinformation [45], and the government had direct 
regulations over fake news and political advertising 
[44]. French law had prohibited the “publication, 
dissemination or reproduction … of fake news, [and] 
items that were made-up, falsified, or untruthfully 
attributed to third parties” since 1881 [46]. The law 
also limits paid political advertising.  
In November 2018, France passed one of the 
earliest “fake news” laws in reaction to internet-based 
and social-media-based dissemination of 
disinformation [47]. This law enables judges to halt 
the dissemination of fake news during electoral 
campaigns, and enacts an innovative provision, asking 
social media platforms to carry the “duty of 
cooperation” and establish a “tool for users to flag 
disinformation” [47]. The specific duties of 
cooperation includes increasing algorithm 
transparency, promoting content of mainstream press 
agencies, removing fake accounts, disclosing 
sponsored content, and developing media literacy 
initiatives [47]. It also authorizes France’s 
broadcasting regulator, the Higher Audiovisual 
Council (CSA), to oversee the cooperative measures 
taken by platforms, and it asks the platforms to 
designate staff members to facilitate dialogue with 
public authorities [47]. Facebook later stated that its 
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measures to increase transparency in political 
advertising were “directly inspired by French 
regulation” [48].  
France’s approach can be considered as an 
example of “direct regulation” [5] or “statutory 
regulation” [9]. In contrast, the EU’s Social Media 
Code of Practice on Disinformation represents the co-
regulation model [5] or “audited self-regulation” [9]. 
It focuses on the voluntary nature of the collaboration 
between governments and platforms, aiming at 
building “a framework for a structured dialogue … to 
ensure greater transparency” [49]. Various platforms 
changed their content policies as responses to the Code 
of Practice. The EU also funded a joint EU-wide 
network for fact-checkers and set up an EU-wide rapid 
alert system for disinformation in 2019 [50]. 
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the EU, in 
addition to strengthening their current anti-
misinformation strategies and partnership, made more 
plans to battle COVID-19 false content, including 
establishing “an agile monitoring and reporting 
programme” in collaboration with more platforms 
[51]. More notable in the policy arena is European 
Parliament members’ calls for more regulations on 
social media [52]. In response, the European 
Commission presented in late 2020 a new legislative 
initiative, the Digital Services Act (DSA), which 
proposes to establish standards and regulations for big 
technology companies regarding user data and the 
spread of disinformation online [53]. This initiative 
signifies the EU’s move towards a stricter and more 
direct regulation model.  
Our data does not show a prominent change of 
French policies regarding false information during the 
pandemic. Compared to other countries in this study, 
however, France’s battle against false information was 
unique in that its public discourse centers on the 
freedom of press. In particular, the norm guardians 
(especially the traditional news/press agencies) have 
played a unique role in fighting false information 
while maintaining freedom of expression and media.  
At the beginning of the pandemic, the French 
Minister of Culture stated France must combat fake 
news by providing access to independent sources of 
information [54]. The French Senate later commended 
four French media stations for their fight against fake 
news, stating that these stations had been essential 
sources of reliable information during a time of rumors 
and disinformation [55]. Furthermore, in response to 
the concerns over freedom of speech, France, together 
with a few other countries, issued a “Joint Statement 
on Safety of Journalists and Access to Information 
during the COVID-19 Crisis”, which states that “free 
and independent media has an important role in 
pushing back against disinformation” and states or 
governments should not impede their work [56]. 
A more illustrative case may be the short-lived 
government-run website that was designed to combat 
coronavirus fake news by providing verified news. In 
May 2020 the French government launched the 
Désinfox website, selecting and publishing reliable 
articles to distribute. This effort was met with outrage 
by many journalists, media sites, and organizations, 
who called it an infringement on freedom of the press 
since the government was cherry-picking information 
[5]. The site was taken down a week later. 
Although France’s false-information regulation 
falls into the direct regulation categories, it shows 
distinct characteristics from other countries in this 
category (e.g., China). Moreover, different from many 
other countries, France’s false-information policy has 
been relatively stable during the pandemic.     
4.4. The UK 
Like many other European countries, the UK 
government was mainly concerned over potential 
threats to national security and democracy caused by 
false information, particularly from foreign actors, 
before the pandemic [58]. These concerns drove the 
government to introduce collaborative initiatives for 
countering false information online and to discuss 
potential legislative actions.  
In these initiatives, the UK government’s strategy 
was to ensure high visibility of government 
information and raise public awareness about false 
information, rather than focus on rebutting false 
information. Several governmental departments and 
statutory bodies were tasked with investigating the 
impact of fake news and confirming factual 
information in 2018 [59]. The intelligence services 
under the Fusion Doctrine were responsible for 
identifying social media platforms distributing false 
information. The Cabinet Office launched the Rapid 
Response Unit (RRU) to monitor false information 
and reclaim a fact-based public debate. The RRU 
focused on providing highly visible public information 
and ensuring impactful government communication, 
particularly in times of crisis. In addition, the 
responsibility of the National Security 
Communications Team (NSCT) was expanded to 
tackle communications elements of threats to national 
security, including disinformation [58]. The NSCT 
also implemented media literacy campaigns to help the 
public better discern the reliability of online 
information [60]. Later, in 2019, the Office of 
Communications (Ofcom), the regulator of the 
communications services, also engaged in media 
literacy research and policy work by establishing a 
media advisory panel and forming a network of expert 
representatives from across the industry, the third 
sector, and academia. 
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Meanwhile, the UK government was also in the 
process of considering legislative actions. In 2017, the 
Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport 
(DCMS) initiated an 18-months inquiry on 
disinformation to understand the features of inaccurate 
information and evaluate its impact on both 
democracy and the individual [61]. Based on 
recommendations in the report resulting from this 
inquiry, DCMS and the Home Office issued the Online 
Harms White Paper in April 2019 with plans to tackle 
the issues of online harms, including disinformation. 
This white paper recommends the government to set 
“a new framework for ensuring disinformation is 
tackled effectively, while respecting freedom of 
expression and promoting innovation” [62].  
As the threat of an infodemic increases during 
pandemic, the UK government has intensified their 
efforts by pushing the legislation process to regulate 
the platforms, enhancing media literacy, and 
increasing the visibility of accurate data.  
The DCMS Select Committee published a 
COVID-19 "infodemic" report and urged the 
government to act swiftly to regulate platforms and 
false information. In February 2020 the government 
announced its intent to appoint Ofcom as the 
independent online harms regulator to implement and 
enforce the new regulatory framework [63]. During 
the pandemic, Ofcom provided information about fact-
checking and debunking sites and tools. It collected a 
set of resources to help cut through the confusion and 
provide people with the tools to navigate news and 
information about the coronavirus [64]. In December 
2020, the DCMS and the Home Office published the 
Full Government Response to the Online Harms White 
Paper consultation and claimed to enact the online 
harms regulatory framework through legislation. The 
proposal would hand Ofcom the power to identify 
“lawful but harmful” content and to fine and block the 
sites of social media giants [62].  
The UK government also adopted other actions, 
such as launching a GOV.UK Coronavirus 
Information service on WhatsApp to provide official 
and timely information and advice about COVID-19 
[65, 66]. In addition, the UK government enhanced the 
detection of pandemic related false information and 
public education by collaborating with international 
organizations and academia. The RRU assigned 
dedicated specialists to identify instances of false 
information on social media, and then coordinated 
with the platforms to either remove or rebuttal them. 
The government also worked with WHO for 
promoting a global campaign of “Stop The Spread” to 
raise awareness about the risks of false information 
around COVID-19 [67], and invested £29 millions of 
government funding to support six research centers 
across the UK to address challenges around online 
safety and privacy, including the spread of 
disinformation [68].  
In summary, before the pandemic, the anti-
misinformation practices in the UK were scattered 
without any specific laws to prohibit the publication of 
online false information. The pandemic has 
accelerated the formation of a co-regulation model 
under the legislation framework in the UK.  
4.5. The US 
Before the pandemic, the US had more foci than 
any other country in combatting false information, 
including “[p]olitical ads, foreign disinformation, 
general misinformation, media literacy and deepfake 
videos” [45]. What they lacked, however, was a top-
down, national policy response or large-scale 
collaborative initiatives.  
During the 2016 presidential campaign, many 
incidents of hacking, social media account 
manipulation, and foreign interference were reported 
and investigated [69]. The US Senate announced a bill 
in October 2017 to regulate political ads on the 
internet, called the Honest Ads Act, aiming to bring 
similar rules used for traditional media to social media 
platforms [70]. The effort to regulate platforms 
regarding political advertisements was unsuccessful, 
and social media platforms remained largely self-
regulated. Facebook, Twitter, and Google admitted to 
the Senate that Russia manipulated their platforms but 
were confident in their own measures to monitor fake 
accounts and ad buyers [71]. 
Faced with the spreading of fake news, some state 
governments introduced bills trying to monitor false 
information on social media, but these failed too [72]. 
The only successful policy action was the enactment 
of several state laws that mandate improving media 
literacy through civic or public education [45].  
During the pandemic, the concerns and debates 
over false information intensified greatly, leading to 
increased action from the US government. Many 
government departments and agencies, including 
FEMA, the CDC, and the CISA, have sections of their 
websites dedicated to rumor control, answering 
frequently asked questions, dispelling myths, and 
pointing the public to scientific, accurate information 
sources [73-75]. Congress has introduced a bill known 
as the “COVID-19 Misinformation and 
Disinformation Task Force Act of 2020,” which 
recognizes the importance of a “coordinating 
understanding” as well as a “whole-of-government 
approach” in the US’s fight against the spread of 
COVID-19 related false information [76]. It also 
outlines the importance of improving media literacy. 
In addition, Congress has passed a resolution 
“condemning anti-Asian discrimination relating to 
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coronavirus” in an attempt to address a new side of 
COVID-19 disinformation [77]. 
The pandemic also prompted increased 
conversation between the US government and 
platforms. One Congressman wrote to the CEOs of 
major platforms, praising them for the actions they 
have taken, but urging them to increase their efforts to 
combat online false information [78]. Such 
conversation, however, is fraught with tension, as 
exemplified by the rug of ward between the then-
president, Trump, and the social media platforms. 
Trump passed an Executive Order on “Preventing 
Online Censorship,” which addresses the “selective 
censorship” of the platforms and attempts to hold them 
liable for their content [79]. Platforms have pushed 
back, even going so far as to remove posts made by 
Trump and freezing his account for content in 
violation of the companies’ COVID-19 
misinformation policies [80]. 
The concerns over the role of social media in 
spreading false information were also heightened 
among the public during the pandemic. For example, 
public organizations and policy institutes such as the 
Center for American Progress pushed social media 
platforms to “fundamentally rethink their products to 
reduce the health risks posed by disinformation and 
misinformation about the coronavirus crisis” [81]. The 
public may be calling for more effective information 
policies, but the government has made little progress 
in the realm of formal regulation.  
Another arena of the US’s false-information battle 
was foreign affairs. The US Department of State and 
Trump made many remarks regarding China and 
COVID-19, blaming China for false information and 
non-transparency. The Senate also passed a resolution 
blaming China for intentionally spreading 
misinformation to downplay the risks of COVID-19 
and internal censorship of doctors and journalists [82].  
Multiple actors with different values and interests 
play their roles in the information policy arena of the 
US. The foci of fighting false information shifted 
before and during the pandemic, but the overall 
regulation model shows little change—self regulation 
is still the dominant model.  
5. Discussions 
Triggered by the unexpected universal threat, 
national governments actively responded to false 
information by regulating online content and social 
media platforms using both legislative actions and 
collaborative initiatives. The comparative case 
analysis demonstrates that many national governments 
tried to enhance the role of state in the battle against 
the mis-infodemic during the COVID-19 crisis, no 
matter what political regime they have or what 
regulation models they adopted before the pandemic. 
However, their attempts were not always successful—
for example, the US policymakers are still debating, 
and France’s effort to publish select truthful 
information has failed. The existing social norms, 
values, and power dynamics among policy actors are 
all possible explanations for these policy outcomes.  
The case analysis also shows that the regulation 
frameworks of false information are emerging and 
evolving during the pandemic in each country 
differently. In Argentina, the regulation is 
transforming from a co-regulation to a more direct 
regulation model, where the government holds tighter 
control and imposes more interventions, such as cyber 
patrol. In the UK, direct interventions from the UK 
government are limited, but the UK government seems 
to have started shifting from a loose collaboration to a 
more formal co-regulation model with an appointed 
independent regulator under the newly proposed 
legislative framework. The Chinese government 
enhanced its existing direct regulation framework 
during the pandemic and tightened the control of 
platforms by revising and strengthening its laws, 
policies, and enforcement. The US and France do not 
show a clear change in their regulation models. 
However, the US’s information policy arena has more 
negotiations among relevant actors than ever before, 
which is likely to shape future policymaking. The 
practice in France, on the other hand, shows a unique 
path. Although having adopted a direct regulation 
model, the French government encourages traditional 
media to provide independent sources of information 
and protect the freedom of speech. This emphasis on 
empowering the audience makes France’s direct 
regulation distinct from China’s and Argentina’s.  
This study draws from the existing literature on 
false-information regulation, especially the four 
regulation models—self regulation, co-regulation, 
direct regulation, and audience-centered model 
[5,9,10,13]. Our findings imply the limitations of 
using these models as analytical frameworks. As some 
scholars have mentioned in the literature, the models 
may not be mutually exclusive in practice [5]. Indeed, 
our case study reveals a trend of combining different 
regulation strategies in practice that blur the 
boundaries between each model. We found a variety 
of policy actions that may not fit into any of the 
existing models. For example, collaboration, a key 
feature of the co-regulation model, also appears to be 
a common practice in other models, even in 
countries that adopted the direct regulation model. For 
instance, the Chinese government collaborates 
with social media platforms to trace rumors and works 
with traditional media and academia for fact-
checking. France is considered as the typical example 
of direct regulation, but the nature of the regulation can 
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be considered as co-regulation because the French 
government uses law to require social media 
platforms’ collaboration rather than imposing specific 
rules on content. From this perspective, the so-called 
models and predefined static categories may overlap 
too much to be useful for meaningful, theoretical 
analysis. Re-evaluating the characteristics of different 
regulatory practices and extracting new models might 
be necessary for both researchers and practitioners as 
analytical tools or practical guidance. 
Our study selected five countries as a showcase of 
diverse false-information regulation practices and 
used the existing typology of regulation models as a 
loose analytical framework to examine the actions of 
different stakeholders and their interactions, with a 
focus on governments’ policies. Because of the limited 
scope of data collection and the small number of cases, 
findings are not generalizable at the current stage. 
However, this study sheds light on future research. 
First, future research can use a relational perspective 
to unpack how different actors engage in the 
regulation. Examining the relations between the state, 
platforms, and the public will be helpful for us to 
understand the momentum of the regulation formation 
and change. Second, our analysis reveals the influence 
of social media platforms and norm guardians 
(including traditional press, journalists, and public 
interest groups), whose reactions and initiatives also 
shape the regulating process. Last but not least, 
expanded studies with more cases will create a more 
comprehensive and theoretical understanding of false-
information regulations around the globe. 
6. Conclusion 
The pandemic crisis triggered changes of 
regulations in different countries. The state and the 
various social media platforms, in most cases, are still 
the dominant actors in false-information 
policymaking, but other actors are increasingly 
involved. This study looks beyond the western world 
and includes cases in different regions of the world. 
The findings provide empirical evidence on false-
information policies and sheds light on a more 
nuanced understanding of regulation. Our future 
research will include in-depth analysis of the roles of 
more actors from a relational perspective and the 
development of a more useful analytical framework.  
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